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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final order of the Fifth Dis-
trict Court, the Honorable J. Philip Eves, determining heirs and 
construing the Last Will and Testament of the decedent. 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal in ac-
cordance with the provisions of Title 78, Chapter 2 , Section 
2 ( 3 ) ( j ) , Utah Code, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Does the decedent's Last Will and Testament suffi-
ciently contain and express his intention that his named step-
children should inherit such that the District Court abused its 
discretion and committed legal error by not implying a gift to 
them, or has there been a failure adequately to disoose of the 
testator's assets such that his entire estate must be distributed 
according to the intestate succession statutes? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a final order [Record, p. 69.] 
of the Fifth District Court, the Honorable J. Philip Eves, deter-
mining heirs and construing the Last Will and Testament of the 
decedent. 
- . 2 - -
The decedent was survived by his four step-children, to 
wit: Richard L. Hunt, Dennis Rae Hunt, Delbert Douglas Hunt, and 
Den ice Marie Buckley. [Record, p. 16.] Richard Hunt (Appellant) 
was named in the Will as the decedent's Personal Representative. 
[Record, p. 2.] The decedent was also survived by his sister's 
children, to wit: Dawna Bool, Jefferson D. Goulette, and Charlene 
Brown. [Record, p. 31.] Richard Hunt offered for probate the 
Last Will and Testament of the decedent. [Record, p. 1.] The 
Will names the testator's step children, by name specifically, 
and refers to them as his heirs and next of kin. The Will then 
goes on to disinherit all other claimants. The Will provides 
that the Personal Representative may sell all or a part of the 
estate as determined by the Personal Representative. [Addendum, 
Last Will and Testament.] 
The Personal Representative then filed a Petition for 
Interpretation of Will. [Record, p. 15.] The District Court 
found that the decedent's Will failed to dispose of any assets 
and concluded therefore as a matter of law that the assets must 
be distributed to the decedent's heirs at law as determined by 
the intestate succession statutes. [Record, p. 69.] The District 
Court also concluded that the four step-children were not heirs 
of the decedent for intestate succession purposes and ordered the 
assets of the estate distributed to Dawna Bool, Jefferson D. 
Goulette, and Charlene Brown. [Record, p. 71.1 The District 
- - 3 - -
Court failed to make any findings on the intention of the testa-
tor. 
Thereafter, by stipulation of the parties, Richard Hunt 
resigned as Personal Representative and attorney Kent Corry, Esq. 
was appointed successor Personal Representative. [Record, p. 86.] 
The real parties in interest are the four step-children 
who claim the estate of the decedent under the Will (gift by im-
plication) on the one hand, and the two nieces and one nephew of 
the decedent who claim the estate under the District Court's or-
der interpreting the Will on the other hand. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The law favors testacy rather than intestacy, and a 
Will evidencing an intention to dispose of the entire estate 
should be interpreted in such a manner as to prevent intestacy. 
In re Swa n's Estate, 48 P.2d 77, subsequent opinion 55 P.2d 1171 
(Cal. App. 1935); In re Hauge's Estate, 9 P.2d 1065 (Mont. 1 9 3 2 ) ; 
In re Bragg's Estate, 76 P.2d 57 (Mont. 1938). Where a Will 
does not contain an express disposition of assets, a gift by im-
plication should be implied in order to give effect to the ex-
pressed intention of the testator and thereby avoid intestacy. 
In re Will of McDowell, 469 P.2d 711 (NM 1970). 
The decedent's Will in this matter clearly expresses 
his intentions that the step-children are his heirs or next of 
kin and that his blood relatives are to be disinherited. A gift 
by implication to the step-children should have been implied by 
the District Court, thereby giving effect to the testator's in-
tentions and avoiding intestacy. 
ARGUMENT 
The Will provides, "I have intentionally and with full 
knowledge omitted to provide for any and all of my heirs and next 
of kin who are not specifically mentioned herein, and I hereby 
generally and specifically disinherit each, any and all persons 
whomsoever claiming to be or who may be lawfully determined to be 
my heirs at law . . .." (Emphasis added.) [Addendum, Last Will 
and Tes tament.] 
It is clear that the testator i ntended to exclude from 
his estate everyone except his four named step-children. He af-
firmatively so stated. He did not, unfortunately, affirmatively 
state that his estate should be distributed to the step-children, 
but by negative implication he expressed his clear intention that 
his four named step-children were to be the beneficiaries of his 
estate. [Addendum, Last Will and Testament.] 
The District Court committed plain error, therefore, 
and abused its discretion in failing to find the intention of the 
- - 5 - -
testator and that the testator's intention was to give his entire 
estate to his step-children. 
It is a long-standing legal maxim that courts favor 
testacy rather than intestacy, and that a Will evidencing an in-
tention to dispose of the entire estate should be interpreted, if 
oossible, in such a manner as to prevent intestacy. In re Swan' s 
Estate, 48 P.2d 77, subsequent opinion 55 P.2d 1171 (Cal. A D D . 
19 3 5 ) ; In re Hauge's Estate, 9 P.2d 1065 (Mont. 193?); U} re 
Bragg's Estate, 76 P.2d 57 (Mont. 1938). 
The intention of the testator herein, 3 s < xnrpssed by 
him in the Will, is clearly that the four named step-children re-
ceive the entire estate. The testator specifically named each of 
them, identifying each of them as his step-children, and then ex-
cluding and disinheriting everyone else (anyone not specifically 
named in the Will) from sharing in his estate. He also named one 
of his step-children as his Personal Representative (Richard L. 
Hunt, appellant herein), and directed that he serve without bond. 
[Addendum, Last Will and Testament.] 
The paramount rule of construction requires that a Will 
be construed according to the testator's intention. Matter of 
Estate of Shadder, 599 P.2d 1071 (NM 1979); In re Estate of Rus-
sell , 444 P.2d 353 (Cal. 1968). 
"The Court's foremost duty in this 
matter is 'to ascertain the desire 
of the testator, as he has ex-
- - 6 - -
pressed it, and to carry it to ful-
fillment,' unless prohibited by 
public policy or general rule of 
law. * * * [T]he attempt to arrive 
at the intention of the testator 
'is invariably the first and 
paramount inquiry.' [Citations 
omitted.]" In re Estate of Rus-
sell , 444 P.2d 353 (Cal . 1968). 
"The intention of a testator as exoressed in his Will 
controls the legal effect of his dispositions. The rules of con-
struction exoressed in the succeeding sections of this part apply 
unless a contrary intention is indicated by the Will." Utah Uni-
form Probate Code, as amended, ^75-2-603. (Emphasis added.) 
It is also well-settled that "a gift by implication 
will be imnlied in order to effectuate the intent of the testa-
tor." In re Will of McDowell , 469 P.2d 711 (NM 1970) In that 
case, the Will contained no express provision for the disposition 
of the estate assets upon the death of the survivor of the testa-
tor. The contestants alleged there (as do the niece and nephews 
here) that the Will was not dispositive of the estate. The court 
held that, the intent of the testator must be determined from the 
Will itself when considered as a whole. The court found it nec-
essary to imply a gift in order to give effect to the testator's 
i ntent. 
Similarly, in Seattle-First Nat'1 Bank v. Tingley, 589 
P.2d 811 (Wash 1978), the decedent died with a Will that did not 
discuss any express disposition of a coin collection. The dece-
. - 7 . . 
dent's son alleged that there was a gift by implication of the 
coin collection to him. The Court said: 
The proponent [of a gift by impli-
cation] must show that the testator 
had a manifest and plain intent to 
create the gift, but that he failed 
to express himself as distinctly a :> 
he should have. The showing of in-
tent must be so strong that a con-
trary intent cannot be supposed to 
have existed in the testator's 
mi nd . _I_d . , page 814 . 
In the oresent case, the testator's intent is clearly 
evident. He specifically disinherited evervone who was not 
specifically named in the Will, and he specifically named only 
his steo-ch1 1 dren . He failed to exoress himself as distinctly as 
he should have, because he used the negative rather than the pos-
itive grammatical structure. That is, he should have exoressed 
himself by saying that only his four step-children are to receive 
his estate and no one else is. Instead, he named his step-chil-
dren and then said that no one not named in his Will is to re-
ceive the estate. Admittedly, he should have expressed himself 
in the affirmative grammatical structure; but, his intention is 
clear and the Will can admit of no other reasonable interpre-
tation. The failure by the District Court to find what the tes-
tator's intention was (and that it was, logically, to favor the 
step-children) resulted in a finding of intestacy rather than the 
favored finding of testacy, which is contrary to the cardinal 
rules of construction of a Will and the oolicv of the Utah Uni-
- - 8 - -
form Probate Code [§75-2-603], an error of law, and an abuse of 
discretion. In re Estate of Russell, 444 P.2d 353 (Cal. 1968). 
In Schauf v. Thomas, 498 P.2d 256 (Kan 1972), the dece-
dent's Will failed to make any direct mention of how the trust 
income was to be handled. The court there stated: 
When a court is called upon to de-
termine the force and effect to be 
given the terms of a will, the car-
dinal rule of construction to which 
all other rules are subordinate is 
that the intention of the testator 
as garnered from all parts of the 
will is to be given effect . . .. 
In construing a will the court must 
put itself as nearly as possible in 
the situation of the testator when 
he made the will, and from a con-
sideration of that situation and 
from the language used in eyery 
part of the will, determine as best 
it can the purpose of the testator 
and the intentions he endeavored to 
convey by the language used. Id. , 
page 262. 
Even where the testamentary intent of the maker of a 
document is uncertain or doubtful, the court must determine the 
intention of the maker from all of the evidence. Benton v. Albu-
querque Nat'l Bank, 701 P.2d 1025 (NM App. 1985). In this case, 
the District Court failed to find any intent of the testator. 
When the District Court concluded [Record, p. 70] that the step-
children were not entitled to any interest in the estate by ex-
Dress provision in the Will or by implication [Record, p. 7 0 ] , it 
failed to follow the legal maxim that the testator's intention is 
the paramount and controlling rule of construction; for the tes-
tator's intent is clearly expressed in the Will and the District 
Court should have found a gift by implication in order to give 
effect to the testator's intent. In re Will of McDowell, 469 
P.2d 711 (NM 1970). 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant, Richard L. Hunt, respectfully submits that 
the order of the District Court interpreting the Will and order-
ing distribution of the estate assets to the nephews and niece 
should be reversed, and that this Honorable Supreme Court remand 
the case to the District Court for entry of an order finding that 
the step-children are the testator's intended beneficiaries and 
are entitled to the distribution of the estat< 
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Utah Uniform Probate Code, s 75-2-603 
Last Will and Testament of Reed Dwane Hunt 
Order Construing Will and Determining Heirs 
tion of the testator's will or m the valid last will of a 
person who has predeceased ihe testator (regardless 
of the existence, size, or characLer of the corpus of the 
trust). The devise is not invalid because the trust is 
amendable or revocable, cr because the trust was 
amended after the execution of the will or after the 
death of the testator. Unless the testator's will pro-
vides otherwise, the. property so devised \s wot 
deemed to be held under a testamentary trust of the 
testator but becomes a part of the trust to which it is 
given and shall be admini^ered and disposed of in 
accordance with the proviswrif of the instrument or 
will setting forth the terms of the trust, including any 
amendments thereto made before the death of the 
testator (regardless of whether made before or after 
the execution of the testator** will), and, if the testa-
tor's will so provides, including any amendments to 
the trust made after the de*t& of the testator. A revo-
cation or termination of the trust before the death of 
the testator causes the devise to lapse, but mere ex-
haustion of the trust corpus between the time of exe-
cution of the testator's will and the testator's death 
shall not constitute revocation or termination of the 
trust causing the devise to Ugme. 1977 
75-2-512. Events of independent significance. 
A will may dispose of property by reference to acts 
and events which have sigmrfiranee apart from their 
effect upon the dispositions made by the will, whether 
they occur before or after the execution of the will or 
before or after the testator* death. The execution or 
revocation of a will of another person is such an 
event. 1975 
75-2-513. Separate writing identifying bequest 
of tangible property. 
Whether or not the provisions relating to holo-
graphic wills apply, a will n a y refer to a written 
statement or list to dispose «tf items of tangible per-
sonal property not otherwise specifically disposed of 
by the will, other than money,, evidences of indebted-
ness, documents of title, audi •eeuri ties, and property 
used in trade or business. T»fceadmissible under this 
section as evidence of the irtended disposition, the 
writing must either be in the handwriting of the tes-
tator or be signed by him anlsBust describe the items 
and the devisees with reasonable certainty. The writ-
ing may be referred to as oa t *• be in existence at the 
time of the testator's death; it; may be prepared before 
or after the execution of the^wtt; it may be altered by 
the testator after its piepemiion; and it may be a 
writing which has no significance apart from its ef-
fect upon the dispositions mmie by the will. If there 
are several writings in erinkimy which contain con-
flicting provisions, the wrftng which is established 
by a date or other circunintMHUB to be the most recent 
shall control. If it is i mi in—lit to determine which 
writing is the most recent, Ike-consistent provisions 
of the several writings shall fee considered valid, and 
the conflicting provisions shell fee considered invalid. 
1977 
survive the testator or survive the testator for a 
stated period in order to take under the will. 
(2) If the time of death of the testator, the devisee, 
or both cannot be determined and it cannot be estab-
lished that the devisee has survived the testator by 
120 hours, unless the will contains language provid-
ing otherwise, it is deemed that the devisee has failed 
to survive Cor the required period. \yj& 
75-2-602. Choice of law as to meaning and effect 
of wills. 
The meaning and legal effect of a disposition in a 
will shall be determined by the local law of a particu-
lar state selected by the testator in his instrument 
unless the application of that law is contrary to the 
provisions relating to the elective share described in 
Part 2 of this chapter, the provisions relating to ex-
empt property and allowances described in Part 4 of 
this chapter, or any other public policy of this state 
otherwise applicable to the disposition. I97« 
75-2-603. Rules of construction and intention. 
The intention of a testator as expressed in his will 
controls the legal effect of his dispositions. The rules 
of construction expressed in the succeeding sections of 
this part apply unless a contrary intention is indi-
cated by the will. 1975 
75-2-604. Construction that will passes all prop-
erty — After-acquired property. 
A will is construed to pass all property which the 
testator owns at his death including property ac-
quired after the execution of the will. 1975 
75-2-605. Anti-lapse — Deceased devisee — 
Class gifts. 
If a devisee who is an heir of the testator ia dead at 
the time of execution of the will, fails to survive the 
testator, or is treated as if he predeceased the testa-
tor, the issue of the deceased devisee who survive the 
testator by 120 hours take in place of the decease/! 
devisee by representation. One who would have befcn 
a devisee under a class gift if he had survived the 
testator is treated as a devisee for purposes of this 
section whether his death occurred before or after the 
execution of the will. 1975 
75-2-606. Failure of testamentary provision. 
(1) Except as provided in Section 75-2-605 if a de-
vise other than a residuary devise fails for any rea-
son, it becomes a part of the residue. 
(2) Except as provided in Section 75-2-605 if the 
residue is devised to two or more persons and the 
share of one of the residuary devisees fails for any 
reason, his share passes to the other residuary devi-
see or to other residuary devisees in proportion to 
their interests in the residue. 1975 
75-2-607. Change in securities — Accessions — 
Nonademption. 
(1) If the testator intended a specific devise of cer-
tain securities Trther thaja the equwsAeirt, vatae 
thereof, the specific devisee is entitled only to: 
(a) As much of the devised securities as is a 
L A S T W ! L H A N D T t l i A m K i i « 
Rejed..£wan.e..H.iin.t:. , a resident of 
L ? A . . ? . ? . y t h . J ^ 84737 
eclare this to be mu last Will and revoke all other Wills previously made by me: 
Fnvnr: I Reed Dwane hunt being of sound and disposing mind and memory, 
and not acting under duress, fraud or undue influence of any person 
whomsoever, do hereby make, publish and declare this to be my Last Will 
and Testament, hereby revoking'a-ny and all Wills, Codicils or Testamen-
tary dispositions by me at any time heretofore made. 
Second: I declare that I am a single man, and that I have four (4) step-
childern. Richard L Hunt, Delbert Douglas Hunt, Denice Marie Buckley, 
and Dennis Ray Hunt. If/ at any time, any person shall be established 
by a Court of Law to be a child of mine, then I give and bequeath to 
each such person the sum of Five Dollars ($5.00) and no more. 
Third: I have intentionally and with full knowledge omitted to provide 
for any and all of my heirs and next of kin who are not specifically 
mentioned herein, and I hereby generally and specifically disinherit 
each, any and all persons whomsoever claiming to be or who may be 
lawfully determined to be my heirs at law, except as otherwise mentioned 
in this Will; and to any person or persons who shall sucessfully establish 
in a Court of competent jurisdiction, that he or she is entilted to any 
portion of my estate, other than as mentioned in this Will, I hereby 
give and bequeath to such person or persons the sum of ONE DOLLAR 
($1.00) and no more, in lieu of any other share or interest in my 
estate. 
: J appoint .Rajiha£d.X_..JIua.t..©.^  » 
Gaunt* ..Qf...GlAKk^  — 
as Execut.DX of this Wi7J.....TJAe...&xe.GW^ serve 
which I may own' or be entitled to at his discretion. 
This Will was signed by me on the 2n.d day of .^£?.mJ?e.£ » 19?.?....., 
z%L^..&~*^^ 
T H E FORECOINC INSTRUMENT was, on the date thereof, signed by the tcst&X&X, , 
RA?.d..Pwane J l u n t , in our presence, we being present at the jeme 
time, iind ...he then declared to us that the said instrument was h±s... last Will; and we, at 
the request of said ....?.P..^4...^D.?...!J.U.P.S , and in A...1.?. presence, and in 
the presence of each other, Jiave signed the same as witnesses. We further declare tlxat at the 
time of siring this will the said. .!?5.\?.?!...9.Y?:?.1.1.0..Ji.V.P..^  appeared to be 
of sound nrul disposing mind and memory and not acting under duress, ™°"»™ 4*""dorthe 
un/bfr "'/'''-"'fXf n! nnt! prrsoi\ uliomsoctirr. 
.(JLJ^C/./^^>J..C^^ residing at 
T \ / / I //O-/YJ^~ irttftKituir of Wiling* / ? ( / 
!>iKiu»turd of W >lnoM 
" " reMinfiatJ&i (?«<?*& Ck^Af-oM 
residing n1 //7£/..^j2.<***?.,J^^^^. 
Lyle R. Drake - 3692 
SNOW, NUFFER, ENGSTROM & DRAKE 
A Professional Corporation 
90 East 200 North 
P.O. Box 400 
St. George, Utah 84771-0400 
801/628-1611 
File # 5772-01 ;LRD/CHW1 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF ] 
REED DWANE HUNT 
Deceased. 
I ORDER CONSTRUING WILL 
I AND DETERMINING HEIRS 
I Probate No. 3202 
This matter came on regularly for hearing on July 11,1989, Lyle R. Drake 
of Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom & Drake appearing for Petitioners Dawna Bool, 
Jefferson D. Goulette, and Charlene Brown, and Keith Oehler appearing for the 
personal representative Richard L. Hunt and various stepchildren of the 
decedent. Both parties were heard, and requested an opportunity to file 
. additional Memoranda Points and Authorities. Memoranda of Points and 
Authorities were filed by both parties and the matter was submitted to the Court 
for a ruling without oral argument, pursuant to Rule 04-501. The Court 
considered decedent's Will, the Memoranda of Points and Authorities, and all 
documents filed in this matter. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Court makes the following findings of facts: 
A. The Will of the decedent dated December 2,1988, fails to dispose 
of any assets. 
1 
B. At the time of his death, the decedent had no living issue, spouse, 
parents, or siblings. 
C. Dawna Bool, Jefferson D. Goulette and Charlene Brown are the 
only children of decedent's only sibling, Jesse Hunt Goulette. 
D. Dawna Bool, Jefferson D. Goulette, and Charlene Brown, and their 
respective children, are the only living descendents of the decedent's parents. 
E. Richard L. Hunt, Dennis Rae Hunt, Delbert Douglas Hunt, and 
Denice Marie Buckley are step-children of the decedent, and were never 
adopted by the decedent. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Court makes the following conclusions of law: 
A. The assets of the decedent are not disposed of by his Will and 
therefore pass according to the laws of intestate succession, to the heirs of the 
decedent. 
B. The disinheritance clauses used in the Will do not prevent an heir 
from receiving a statutory intestate share of the estate. 
C. Stepchildren are not heirs of a decedent. 
D. Richard L. Hunt, Dennis Rae Hunt, Delbert Douglas Hunt, and 
Denice Marie Buckley are not heirs of the decedent. 
E. Richard L Hunt, Dennis Rae Hunt, Delbert Douglas Hunt, and 
Denice Marie Buckley receive nothing under the Will of the decedent, either by 
its express terms or by implication. 
F. Pursuant to U.C.A. §75-2-103 (1), Dawna Bool, Jefferson D. 
Goulette, and Charlene Brown are the only heirs at law of the decedent. 
G. Dawna Bool, Jefferson D. Goulette, and Charlene Brown are the 
sole beneficiaries, in equal shares, of the entire estate of the decedent under 
his Will. 
2 
H. Notice has been given as required by law. 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED as follows: 
1. The heirs of the decedent are Dawna Bool, Jefferson D. Goulette, 
and Charlene Brown. 
2. The entire estate of the decedent vests in and shall be distributed 
to Dawna Bool, Jefferson D. Goulette and Charlene Brown in equal shares, 
subject to administration. 
DATED this 5-7£ day of frml^U' _, 1989. 
PHILIP EVE 
istrict Court Jddge 
^pPRPMO^ on thic S'V 
& 




I hereby certify that on the 6th day of September, 1989, I served a 
signed copy of the foregoing ORDER CONSTRUING WILL AND DETERMINING 
HEIRS on each of the following by depositing a copy in the U.S. Mail, postage pre-
paid, addressed to: 
Keith S. Oehler, Esq. 
P.O. Box 1234 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Secretary 
A 
